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INSURANCE
WESLEY M. WALK=R*
No substantial change occurred in the law of insurance this
year, but several of the decisions are factually interesting and
serve to reaffirm basic principles previously announced by
our Court. In addition, the Court was called upon during this
period to construe and interpret several provisions contained
in the standard insurance policy and to rule upon the trial
court's application of such policy provisions to the facts in-
volved.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage Provisions
The case of Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co.' is the most note-
worthy case decided by the Supreme Court in this field dur-
ing the period covered by this survey. Allstate Insurance
Company had issued to the plaintiff-respondent its policy of
automobile insurance, Section II of which was entitled, "Pro-
tection against bodily injury by uninsured automobiles."
The policy contained the following specific provision:
Allstate will pay all sums which the insured shall be
legally entited to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
such automobile.
The policy further contained as an exclusion bodily injury of
an insured where the insured or his representatives "without
the written consent of Allstate, make any settlement with,
or prosecute to judgment any action against, any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefor." It was also
required that upon instituting any legal action for bodily in-
jury against any other person by the insured or his repre-
sentative, a copy of the summons and complaint should be
immediately mailed to Allstate.
The insured was in collision with one Cunningham and suf-
fered certain personal injuries. Upon report of the accident
*Member of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville,
S.C.
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the insurer, after investigation, determined that the accident
was the fault of the insured and settled with Cunningham his
claim against the insured for damage to his automobile by
paying him the amount thereof. Upon refusal by the insurer
of the insured's claim for the personal injuries which he re-
ceived in the collision, the insured brought suit against Cun-
ningham and recovered judgment by default in the sum of
$1,500.00. For that amount and the costs of the action, this
suit against the insurer was instituted.
Prior to the insured's bringing suit against Cunningham,
his attorney had corresponded with the Claims Manager for
the insurance company and had received a letter from the
Claims Manager, stating that:
... our investigation of the accident indicated that Mr.
Childs was responsible for this accident, and hence, could
not have any claim under the uninsured motorist cov-
erage. As a result of our investigation of the accident,
and our determination of the liability as resting on our
insured, we have settled the property damage claim of
the Cunninghams.
At the time suit was instituted against Cunningham, the in-
sured's attorney wrote to the Claims Manager so advising and
enclosing copies of the suit papers. The Claims Manager
wrote back calling attention to the provisions of the policy re-
quiring that written consent of the company be secured before
such an action could be initiated and further stating that a
prosecution to judgment of the action against Cunningham
would relieve Allstate of any obligations under the bodily in-
jury benefit insurance protection of the insured's policy. Af-
ter the insured reduced his claim against Cunningham to
judgment, the Claims Manager made written refusal of the
insured's claim contending that since the action had been
brought without the written consent of the insurer, the in-
sured had violated his policy and brought himself under the
exclusion relating thereto. That same defense was used in
the trial of the insured's subsequent action against the com-
pany, and the exclusion pleaded. The case was submitted to
the jury which returned a verdict for the insured from which
the insurer appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the insured
stating that since the insurer had independently determined
[Vol. 14
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for itself without any apparent aid that its insured was at
fault and legally responsible for the collision with the unin-
sured driver and had on that account denied liability under
the uninsured motorist provision of the policy, it simply was
not in position to invoke the provision of the policy requiring
that the insured obtain written permission of the company
prior to bringing suit. The Court stated that it was not called
upon to consider the efficacy and validity of this clause under
other circumstances, but that it dealt only with the facts in-
volved in this case, special emphasis being placed upon the
correspondence between the parties. Cited as being in point
was Batson v. South Carolina Mut. Ins. Co.2 where the defen-
dant insurer denied all liability on a fire insurance policy con-
taining similar provisions and the question for determination
was whether the insured could maintain an action without
compliance with the policy provisions. Our Court quoted from
that case the following:
This question has been recently considered in Thompson
v. Piedmont Mutual Ins. Co., 77 S.C. 486, 58 S.E. 341, and
the conclusion reached was that when an insurance com-
pany denies all liability and refuses to make an assess-
ment, an action at law is maintainable to recover the
amount of damages which the insured would be entitled
to recover if the company had performed its part of the
contract. 3
The Court in the Childs case was additionally faced with
the insurer's contention that the insured was not entitled to
bring suit under the policy for failure to comply with its arbi-
tration provision that in the event of disagreement as to
whether or not the insured should be legally entitled to re-
cover damages, or as to the amount to which he was entitled,
the matters upon which the insurer and insured did not agree
should be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules
of the American Arbitration Association. It was alleged that
this was a condition precedent to suit. The Court held that
the purported agreement for arbitration is unenforceable in
South Carolina, stating that
Such an agreement is upheld when it provides for arbi-
tration of the amount of the loss but that at hand under-
2. 78 S. C. 309, 58 S. E. 936 (1907).
3. Childs v. Mut. Ins. Co., 237 S. C. 455, 463, 117 S. E. 2d 867, 871
(1961).
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takes to require arbitration of the question of liability
and is, therefore, not binding upon the parties. 4
Construction of Policy
In Stephens v. Cottingharm5 the Court considered the mean-
ing of an exclusion provision in a vehicle liability policy which
said that "coverage under this policy shall be null and void
in the event that more than two (2) of the tractors covered
are operated at any one time since one (1) of the tractors
covered is a spare to be operated only when one of the other
tractors is out of service due to mechanical breakdown, re-
pair, or overhaul."
At the time of the accident, one of the insured's tractors
was en route to Baltimore and another was returning from
there. The insured intended to stop the returning tractor in
Laurinburg, North Carolina, to have its motor repaired, and
replace it with the third tractor. With this in view he di-
rected an employee to take the third tractor to a filling stat-
ion to have it serviced; and as this tractor entered the high-
way it collided with the plaintiff.
The trial judge held that "sending an unloaded tractor to
a local filling station to be serviced.. ." would not constitute
"an operation under the exclusion clause of the policy."16 The
Supreme Court reversed this holding and ordered judgment
for the insurer saying that the clear intent of the provision
"was to exclude coverage when all three pieces of equipment
were exposed at the same time to the hazard of an accident.
A risk of liability exists whenever a tractor is in operation
regardless of the purpose for which it is used."'7
The question before the Court in Tsalapatas v. Phoenix
Ins. Co.8 was whether the insured's boat was considered as
being "laid up and out of commission" at the time the damage
was sustained, in accordance with a warranty to that effect
in the policy. The insured had taken the boat from the boat-
house to the dock some 300 yards distance to be inspected and
repaired, and while proceeding back to the boathouse under
its own power it struck an underwater object and sank.
4. Id. at 460, 117 S. E. 2d at 869-870.
5. 237 S. C. 108, 115 S. E. 2d 505 (1960).
6. Id. at 113, 115 S. E. 2d at 507.
7. Id. at 114, 115 S. E. 2d at 507.
8. 236 S. C. 508, 115 S. E. 2d 49 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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The Court refused to accept the insured's argument that
the laid-up warranty must be construed in the light of the cus-
tom and practice of the particular locality, but held that the
warranty had been broken and the insurer was not liable, the
reason being that the risk of striking an underwater object
while the boat was being operated under its own power was
one of the risks sought to obviated by the terms of the war-
ranty.
Fraud and Insurance Contracts
The case of Kinard v. United Ins. Co.9 involved an action
for fraudulent and wrongful cancellation of a health, accident
and life policy. It was alleged that the insurer in 1947 issued
a policy which provided life insurance of $200.00 on the plain-
tiff's husband, a weekly sick or accident benefit of $10.00,
with further provision for waiver of premiums upon total and
permanent disability. In 1953, the plaintiff became so dis-
abled and gave repeated notices to the insurer which never-
theless continued to demand payment of premiums until Sep-
tember, 1957, when the custom of calling at plaintiff's home
for the collection of premiums was discontinued. The insured
died on January 11, 1958, and plaintiff, as beneficiary, filed
proof thereof, but the insurer refused payment of the death
benefit and informed the plaintiff that the policy had been
cancelled in September, 1957. The complaint filed alleged
numerous fraudulent acts by the insurer's agent and further
contended that the cancellation was fraudulent and with
knowledge of the physical condition of the insured which en-
titled him to a waiver of the premiums. The insurer answered
by way of general denial, admitted that it had made some
disability claim payments under the policy, but alleged that
the policy was cancelled upon the insured's failure and refusal
to continue paying the insured's premiums. From a trial
court verdict in favor of the beneficiary, the insurer appealed.
The Supreme Court granted a new trial based upon errors
of the trial judge in instructing the jury with respect to the
burden of proof and form of verdict, but observed that the
evidence produced tended to establish the cause of action
for fraudulent breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent
act or acts and supported the conclusion that the insured was
totally and permanently disabled when the policy was can-
9. 237 S. C. 266, 116 S. E. 2d 906 (1960).
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celled and that the insurer had breached the long established
custom of calling at the home of the insured for collection of
the premiums. It was further held that no estoppel arose,
as a matter of law, because the physician's statement accom-
panying one of the claims for disability benefits answered the
question "... . how long from this date will patient be so con-
fined ?" with "seven days." In his testimony at the trial the
physician had stated that it was his understanding that each
claim was for a specific weekly period and that this statement
should cover that time; that in his opinion during all of the
period of his treatment of the insured, the insured was to-
tally and permanently disabled.
In Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co.10 the action was to re-
cover damages for alleged fraud and deceit in inducing the
the plaintiff to execute a release in favor of the defendant
insurance company. The defendant demurred upon the
grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action in that it appeared upon the face
of the complaint that the plaintiff was able to read and ex-
ecuted the release without reading or informing herself of its
contents, at the same time accepting the benefits of the re-
lease. The demurrer was overruled and this action was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court stated it
would adhere to the rule that one cannot complain of fraud
in the misrepresentation of the contents of a written instru-
ment when the truth could have been ascertained by reading
the instrument and that one entering into a written contract
should read it and avail himself of every opportunity to un-
derstand its contents and meaning. However, the Court
pointed out that the issue before them was whether or not the
complaint stated a cause of action and in the Court's opinion
the complaint was sufficient in this respect. Reference to the
opinion should be had for a discussion of the Court's inter-
pretation of the complaint and the Court's ruling as to why
the complaint stated a cause of action.
In its decision, the Court pointed out the nine elements a
pleader must allege in order to state a good cause of action
for fraud and deceit."1 For the convenience of the reader,
these elements are set forth as follows:
10. 236 S. C. 272, 113 S. E. 2d 817 (1960).
11. Id. at 275, 113 S. E. 2d at 818.
[Vol. 14
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1. A representation;
2. Its falsity;
3. Its materiality;
4. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity;
5. His intent that it should be acted upon by the person;
6. The hearer's ignorance of its falsity;
7. His reliance on its truth;
8. His right to rely thereon;
9. His consequent and proximate injury.
Cancellation of Policy
In McElmurray v. American Fid. Fire Ins. Co. 12 the plain-
tiff contended that the policy in question had not been effec-
tively cancelled. The evidence indicated that plaintiff had
purchased a trailer under a conditional sales contract, that
the seller had prepaid the whole premium on the insurance
policy covering the trailer, that notice of cancellation of the
policy had been sent to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff
had, subsequent to receiving the notice, made two additional
installment payments on the contract. The plaintiff argued
that a portion of these two payments was insurance premiums
and that acceptance by the seller as agent for the insurer
constituted a waiver of cancellation.
The Court rejected this argument saying that since the
seller had prepaid the whole premium, it became a part of the
total indebtedness owed by the plaintiff and the monthly in-
stallment payments were applied to the liquidation of the in-
debtedness and were in no part insurance premiums. The
Court also reaffirmed the position that payment or tender of
unearned premium is not a condition of cancellation where
the policy specifically negates such requirement.
Lienholder's Right to Insurance Proceeds
In the case of Blackwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 8
the Court was afforded an opportunity to reaffirm the well
settled rule that where a mortgagor is bound by a covenant
in the mortgage or otherwise to insure the mortgaged prop-
erty for the better security of the mortgagee, the mortgagee
will have an equitable lien upon the proceeds due on an in-
surance policy taken out by the mortgagor to the extent of the
12. 236 S. C. 195, 113 S. E. 2d 528 (1960).
13. 237 S. C. 649, 118 S. E. 2d 701 (1961).
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mortgagee's interest in the property damaged or destroyed.
The plaintiff here had borrowed money from the bank with
which to purchase an automobile. The loan was secured by a
chattel mortgage which required that the mortgagor should
keep the vehicle insured during the term of the mortgage.
The loan included the amount of the insurance premium.
When the loan was made, the bank immediately applied to
the insurer for comprehensive and collision coverages on the
automobile and paid the premium. A binder receipt was is-
sued to the bank agreeing to issue the requested policy "with
loss payable to the First National Bank of South Carolina."
When the original policy was issued, it was delivered to the
bank, naming Blackwell as the insured. Under the heading,
"Exceptions and Endorsements," there appeared the follow-
ing: "Finance - First National Bank of South Carolina, Co-
lumbia, South Carolina."
The vehicle was subsequently damaged in an accident and
the insurer issued its draft under the policy to the bank.
Blackwell's Administratrix (Blackwell having subsequently
died) instituted suit against the insurer contending that un-
der the policy the loss was payable to Blackwell alone. The
lower court directed a verdict for the plaintiff but the Su-
preme Court reversed this holding stating that is was un-
necessary to determine whether the policy provisions had the
the same effect as a loss payable clause since the bank was
clearly entitled to the proceeds of the policy to the extent of
the mortgage indebtedness under its equitable lien on the in-
surance proceeds. It was further held that had the insurer,
with knowledge of the covenant to insure for the benefit of
the bank, paid the amount of the loss to Blackwell, the right
of the bank to enforce its equitable lien would not have been
affected and the bank could have recovered against the in-
sured the amount of the loss.
Subrogation
In Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James14 the Supreme Court held
that an insurer's right of subrogation was not barred by a re-
lease procured from the insured by the tort-feasorwho knew
that the insured had already received payment from the in-
surer. However, the Court pointed out that the doctrine of
subrogation is founded in equity and natural justice and must
14. 236 S. C. 481, 114 S. E. 2d 832 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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be applied in each instance according to the dictates of equity
and good conscience in the light of the actions and relation-
ship of the parties.
In Rankin v. Superior Auto. Ins. Co.15 the insured had al-
ready instituted an action against the driver of the other ve-
hicle when his insurer paid the loss. The insured thereupon
executed to his insurer a subrogation agreement in which he
pledged all claims for property damages arising out of the
collision. Plaintiff, who was attorney for the insured in the
action already begun, went ahead and settled with the ad-
verse party for $1,600.00. He then notified the insurer of the
settlement and claimed one-third of the amount as an attor-
ney's fee, but the insurer denied that plaintiff was entitled to
any part of the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's decision for the plaintiff giving for their reason
the fact that there was no contract between the parties. The
Court held that the insurer could possibly have intervened in
the action but that its decision not to do so did not have the
effect of authorizing plaintiff to represent its interests. The
incidental benefits derived from plaintiff's services did not
constitute a foundation for a legal claim.
School Policies
During the survey year, the South Carolina Supreme Court
resolved two cases involving school policies, the cases being
unrelated except for the general issue involved.
In Richardson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.16 the insurer had issued
a scholastic accident insurance. policy providing coverage for
bodily injuries caused by accident "directly and independently
of all other causes." The plaintiff, a high school boy, sought
to recover under said policy for medical expenses resulting
from his having slipped and fractured his leg while at school.
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was on crutches and
had his leg in a cast due to having fractured the same leg
some ten days earlier. On trial of the case the defendant in-
surance company moved for a nonsuit and a directed ver-
dict on the ground that the testimony conclusively showed
that the second accident and the resulting medical expense
was not an accident "directly and independently of all
other causes" as required under the policy. Both mo-
15. 237 S. C. 380, 117 S. E. 2d 525 (1960).
16. 237 S. C. 47, 115 S. E. 2d 500 (1960).
1961]
9
Walker: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw QUARTErLY
tions were denied and the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed stating that
whether the expense of hospitalization and operation would
have been incurred had it not been for the second accident
was a question of fact for the jury and was properly submit-
ted to them for their determination. The Court commented
that the testimony of the physician that the plaintiff had re-
covered from the first injury allowed the inference that the
first injury was not a cause of the second injury.
The case of Weston v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.17 was an
action brought for the death of a child who was struck by an
insured school bus, seeking damages in the amount of
$5,000.00 under the provisions of Section 21-840.2 (2), Code
of Laws of South Carolina, (1952). This statute requires
that insurance be maintained on State-owned buses and sets
forth the benefits provided, including:
(1) For lawful occupant of any such school bus who suf-
fers personal injuries or death, a death benefit of two
thousand dollars....
(2) For any person other than a person riding in a
school bus, or a person who qualifies for benefits under
Paragraph (1), who suffers personal injuries or death
because of the negligent operation of any such school bus,
an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars.
It is further provided under this statute that the benefits un-
der Paragraph (1) "shall exist without regard to fault or neg-
ligence," but liability under Paragraph (2) is dependent upon
negligence.
The insurer's motion for a nonsuit was granted upon the
ground that there had been no showing that the deceased was
a third party. The question on appeal was whether the trial
judge erred in his conclusion that the plaintiff's case came
within the provisions of paragraph (1) or whether it fell
within the sections of paragraph (2). The Supreme Court
held that the matter should have been submitted to the jury
for a determination of the questions of fact relating to wheth-
er or not the child had been as "occupant of the bus" or "a
third person"and that the decision of the trial judge granting
the nonsuit should therefore be reversed.
17. 237 S. C. 464, 118 S. E. 2d 67 (1961).
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Presumption Against Suicide
The case of Strawhorne v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co.' s in-
volved an action to recover death benefits under a life insur-
ance policy issued by the defendant insurance company on the
plaintiff's wife. The policy contained a clause providing that
if the insured should die by his or her own hands during the
first two years the policy was in force the company should
be liable only for a return of premiums paid. The defendant
interposed this defense, the insured having died as a result
of a gunshot wound within two years after the issuance of
the policy, but the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for the amount of the death benefits contained in
the policy. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision of the lower court. With regard to the presumption
and burden of proof as it relates to suicide, the Court said:
Where the defense of suicide is interposed by the in-
surer to defeat recovery under a policy of insurance, the
burden is upon the insurer to prove the fact of suicide
by the preponderance of the evidence. It is true that
where death by violent injury has occurred, unexplained,
there is a presumption against suicide, but this is a pre-
sumption of law and not of fact. When evidence as to
the fact of suicide is introduced, the presumption against
suicide vanishes and the question must be resolved under
the evidence. McMillan v. General Amer. Life Ins. Co.,
194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d 562 (1940).19
The Court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding
the insured's death led to but one reasonable conclusion, that
being that the insured came to her death by her own hands.
18. 238 S. C. 40, 119 S. E. 2d 101 (1961).
19. Id. at 43, 119 S. E. 2d at 102.
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